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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
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J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE 
ESTATE OF DANIEL H. MEYER, ELDON 
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Defendants-Respondents. 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 16032 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Rio Algom Corporation, ("Rio"), 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby submits its brief in support of its 
petition for a rehearing in this action. Rio asserts that this 
Court should grant it a rehearing with respect to the Court's 
decision in this matter for the following reasons: 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DETERMINING THAT RIO 
IS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDS RESULTING 
FROM THE AUDREYS' PERMANENT NON-EXERCISE OF 
THE OPTION TO RECEIVE ROYALTIES BASED UPON 
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF CRUDE ORE. 
Rio does not seriously quarrel with the basic logical reason-
ing of the court's decision in this matter. The Court has care-
fully considered each legal argument advanced and rejected it on 
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grounds that, although not beyond argument, are certainly within 
reasonable parameters. Rio seriously urges, however, that by the 
simple accumlation of a series of proper syllogisms, as was the 
Court's opinion, an end result has been reached which is neither 
just nor equitable. What has happened, as Rio views it, is that 
the arguably correct application of a string of legal syllogisms 
has produced a result which is less than the sum of its parts, 
which is unjust, and which, viewed from a different perspective, 
should be overturned. 
Rio frankly recognizes that in its quest before this Court it 
has had to strain and analogize to find applicable law. Rio fur-
ther concedes that there is contract language which, viewed from 
a certain perspective, could be considered to be determinative of 
the issues. Rio respectfully suggests, however, that the Court's 
perspective in this matter has been myopic and that, viewed from a 
different vantage point, the result is inequitable and unfair. 
Rio is not critical of the Court for this result because the Court 
has been led into this failure of perception by the defendants' 
frequent reference to what they have done as merely being a "set-
tlement" a characterization which, for all who are involved in 
litigation, quickly vibrates the heart's tuning fork. Settlement 
is good. Settlement ends disputes. Settlement should be encour-
aged and condoned wherever possible. The defendants have called 
their arrangement a settlement so frequently that it has evoked 
the Lewis Carroll response -- "What I tell you three times is 
true." 
-2-
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In an effort to give this Court a different perspective on 
the issues before it, and to request one more quick look at what 
should be perceived as a clear deprivation of Rio's rights, let 
Rio pose a totally apt hypothetical, and simply ask the Court to 
consider and compare it with the result in the instant case. 
Assume that A and B jointly own property, A having a 75% and 
B a 25% undivided interest. They decide to lease the property to 
C for a one year term with an option to renew at the end of the 
term. Because of a conflict of interest, or any other reason, B 
gives A the complete, sole, unilateral power to set the amount of 
the rental c is required to pay for both the initial term and, if 
C exercises, under the option. A sets the rental at $1,000 per 
month for the initial term of the lease. A and B split the rent-
als, A receiving $750 per month and B $250 per month in direct 
proportion to the interest in the property each holds. 
At the end of the initial term it becomes clear to A that C 
can be required to pay, under the terms of the option to renew, a 
rental of $2,000 per month. C, however, being fully aware of the 
sole power granted A by B to set the amount of rent required of C, 
goes to A and offers to pay A $250 per month under an open, sepa-
rate arrangement, if A will agree to leave C's rent requirement at 
$1,000 per month when C exercises his option. A, in exercise of 
his power, agrees. 
Under this arrangement c pays to A and B jointly $1,000, and 
pays to A alone an additional $250. A now receives from C $1,000 
-3-
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and B gets only $250. This is a result that no court would coun-
tenance, or fail to give B redress for, if B complained. Yet this 
result is precisely what the Court is approving by its decision in 
this matter. A, i.e. the Audreys, 1 is receiving increased rent or 
royalties from its lessee, B, i.e. the Jimcos, while B, a co-
owner, i.e. Rio, is not sharing in that increase. In order to 
justly resolve the issues the Court must require the Audreys to 
share their increased royalties with Rio. 
In its decision the Court approved the Audreys' permanent 
revocation of the right of Rio and the Audreys to receive royal-
ties based upon the fair market value of crude ore. However, in 
approving the Audreys' right to permanently revoke this election, 
the Court overlooked the requirement that the proceeds arising out 
of any election belong to both Rio and the Audreys, because of 
Rio's status as a co-owner of the subject properties and because 
of the terms of the Amended Audrey Lease. Consequently, all pro-
ceeds resulting from the exercise or non-exercise of the election 
rightfully belong to both Rio and the Audreys, and the considera-
tion received by the Audreys from the Jimcos for the Audrey's 
permanent non-exercise of the option belong to both Rio and the 
Audreys. 
1 The term "Audreys" as used in this Brief is as defined in 
Footnote 3 of the Court's September 19, 1980 decision in this 
matter. The term "Jimcos" as used in this Brief is as defined in 
Footnote 2 of that decision. 
-4-
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The Court's failure to require the Audreys to share the pro-
ceeds of their permanent non-exercise of the fair market value 
option with Rio produces an unjust result because the effect is to 
diminish Rio's royalty interests as a l/4th interest co-owner and 
co-lessor. In the event royalties based upon the irrevocably 
waived formula would exceed royalties based upon the formula in 
effect under the settlement agreement, both the Audreys and Rio 
receive less. The Audreys, however, will be compensated for the 
smaller payment by virtue of the Jimcos' agreement to pay the 
Audreys an additional 2.5% of the yellowcake sales price due the 
Jimcos. The Audreys will thus receive as their share of the total 
royalties an amount equivalent to 5.5% of the total sales price of 
yellowcake. On the other hand, Rio receives nothing to compensate 
it for the loss of its right to share in royalties that would be 
received under the fair market value option. Such a scheme is 
patently unfair to Rio. 
The Court's opinion indicates that the terms of the Amended 
Audrey Lease contemplate that Rio may receive a smaller royalty 
payment under an election by the Audreys. That lease, however, 
does not contemplate or suggest that Rio would receive a royalty 
payment smaller in proportion to the required one-fourth/three-
fourths ratio. Although the Court's opinion states that the 
Audreys and Rio share proportionately in the royalty payments made 
pursuant to the Audrey lease, this statement fails to address the 
realities of the situation. Instead of a one-fourth/three-fourths 
-5-
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ratio, the Audreys will receive three-fourths of the amount com-
puted from the lov'er-yielding formula plus a further share of 
royalties to be paid by the Jimcos. Rio, on the other hand, does 
not receive one-fourth of the amount received by the Audreys. 
Rather, it receives one-fourth of the smaller sum computed from 
the lower-yielding formula, without a proportionate share of the 
additional payment received from the Jimcos. The parties to the 
Amended Audrey Lease never intended, or agreed, that Rio would 
receive less than one-fourth of the amount paid to the co-owners 
of the Audrey claims. 
Under the Amended Audrey Lease all royalties and proceeds 
flowing from the property rightfully belong to all the owners of 
the property, including Rio. (Record 80-83.) These include all 
royalties based upon either a yellowcake proceeds calculation or a 
crude ore fair market value calculation. (Record 80-83.) In the 
settlement agreement the Audreys permanently revoked the right of 
Rio and the Audreys to receive royalties based upon the fair 
market value calculation, in exchange for an additional 2.5% 
royalty assigned by the Jimcos. This permanent non-exercise of 
the fair market value option became effective on January l, 1979 
and remains in effect permanently thereafter. Thus, the addi-
tional monies received by the Audreys from the Jimcos, after 
January 1, 1979, is consideration for the non-exercise of the fair 
market value option and the proceeds of that non-exercise are, by 
the terms of the settlement (and the Court's opinion), a royalty 
-6-
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related to production from the property which rightfully belong to 
Rio and the Audreys, even though Rio is not entitled to partici-
pate in the option decision. 
Although there does not appear to be any case law totally on 
point with the instant case, there is a relevant line of oil, gas 
and mineral cases dealing with very similar fact situations. 
Those cases deal primarily with the question of what obligation, 
if any, is owed by the holder of the executive right to lease to 
the owners of non-executive royalty or mineral interests. 
The owners of non-executive interests have no participation 
powers. They have no right to enter upon the premises for devel-
opment purposes and no right to execute leases to others. As a 
consequence, they are almost wholly dependent upon the self-
interest of the mineral owner and upon certain principles of 
equity and fair play to require the executive mineral owner to 
mine the resources and protect their interest. Martz and Hames, 
Implied Rights of the Royalty Owners, 30 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 1, 2 
(1957). 
Although the self-interest of the holder of the executive 
right frequently coincides with that of the non-executive, there 
may be instances when the self-interest of the executive will 
d1verge from that of the non-executive. When those interests are 
divergent, courts have not left the royalty owner completely at 
the mercy of the holder of the executive-leasing privilege. 
Indeed, the great weight of authority holds that an implied duty 
-7-
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governs the exercise of the executive right. 2 H. Williams & 
c. Meyers, Oil & Gas Law § 339.2, at 201 (1977), (hereinafter 
"Williams & Meyers"), and cases cited therein. The duty, which 
arises through the relation created by a reservation or granting 
of the exclusive right to lease, is to protect the non-participa~ 
interests that are dependent to a great extent on the executive. 
Id.; Blass and Richey, An Analysis of the Rights and Duties of 
the Holder of the Executive Right, 41 Miss. L. J. 189, 224-225 
(1970). Stated conversely, the executive operates under a duty tc 
not exercise the executive right for the purpose of benefiting 
himself at the expense, in a preferential way, of the non-executiw 
Williams & Meyers, § 339.3 at 210. 
In the present case, Rio's position is similar to that of a 
non-participatory royalty owner. Because of a conflict of inter-
est, Rio has granted the Audreys the exclusive right to elect 
which royalty formula will be utilized in a given year. Thus, 
like the non-participatory royalty owner, Rio has no input in an 
elective decision affecting the royalty payment. Normally, it 
would be reasonable for Rio to place its trust in the self-interes; 
of the Audreys since the parties stand together as co-lessors and 
would appear to have the same common interest --to choose that 
formula which would maximize the co-lessors' royalty payments. 
In this case, however, the Audreys have used the advantage 
conferred on them by Rio to deprive Rio of its rightful share of 
proceeds arising out of the properties subject to the Amended 
-8-
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Audrey Lease. 2 Th A d h . e u reys ave c1rcumvented the provisions of 
the Amended Audrey lease by entering into an arrangement with the 
Jimcos which benefits the Audreys to the exclusion of Rio. 
Although the courts in the non-executive royalty owner cases 
have found an implied duty of equitable treatment and fair play on 
the part of the executive in his dealings with the non-participating 
or non-executive owner, there is not complete agreement on the 
nature of the duty owed. The standard of conduct governing the 
exercise of the executive right ranges from a fiduciary duty to a 
standard of ordinary care and good faith. Williams & Meyers, 
§ 339.2 at p. 208; Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 Tex. L. 
Rev. 569 (1948). Irrespective of the proper standard, any of the 
overwhelming majority of the cases finding that a duty is owed 
would find a breach of the duty when the executive -- in this 
case, the Audrey defendants -- uses the special position he has 
for his own special advantage to the exclusion of the interests of 
2 As argued above, Rio will receive one-fourth of.a lower-
yieldlng formula instead of one-fourth of the h1gher-y1eld1ng 
formula. The Audreys, on the other hand, will receive three-
fourths of the lower-yielding formula, but in additi~n, they will 
receive additional sums from the Jimcos from wh1ch R10 w1ll not 
be given its proportionate share. Further, it should be noted 
that although the Court has characterized this as an agreement by 
which the Jimcos paid 2.5% of the yellowcake pr1ce to the Audreys, 
it is clear that any monies paid to the Audreys has to come out of 
the monies designated for the Jimcos because the co-owners of the 
Audrey claims have priority with respect to the royalt1es to be 
paid. 
-9-
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the non-executive, in this case, Rio. Williams & Meyers, § 339.3 
at 210; 41 Miss. L. J. at 227. 
consequently, as has been demonstrated above, even though the 
Audreys may have the absolute right to forego exercise of the fair 
market value option, regardless of Rio's interest, they may not 
exercise or not exercise that option without sharing in the pro-
ceeds resulting from that decision with Rio. This is precisely 
what the approval by this Court of the settlement agreement between 
the Audreys and the Jimcos effects. This approval, foreclosing 
Rio's full participat1on in the proceeds of the non-exercise of 
the fair market value option from 1979 forward, constitutes a 
denial, and a derogation, of Rio's property and contract rights. 
This is clear error and the Court should rehear this matter and 
reverse itself with respect to this oversight. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THIS 
LAWSUIT HAS BEEN SETTLED. 
The Court's opinion in this action, at page 11, concludes 
that the agreement at issue in this appeal settles "lengthy and 
costly litigation over the disposition of royalty payments." In 
fact, lengthy and costly litigation still remains. Yet to be 
resolved is the disposition, as between the Jimcos and Rio, of 
royalty payments which have accrued to both parties for the years 
1976 through 1978. The court still must determine what the "fair 
market value of crude ore'' at the mine portal is and allocate to 
Rio one-fourth of 8% of that determined value. Additionally, all 
-10-
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the allegations of the Jimcos' counterclaims remain for resolution. 
The "settlement stipulation" approved by the Court in its opinion 
leaves in place, for costly and time consuming litigation, these 
issues. Consequently, one of the major reasons for the judicial 
policy of encouraging settlement, i.e. conservation of judicial 
resources, does not apply to the rationale set out in the Court's 
opinion used in reaching the result obtained. Judicial resources 
will not be conserved as a lengthy, time consuming and expensive 
court proceeding remains. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out in Rio's Petition for Rehearing and 
1n this Brief, the Court should grant Rio's Petition for Rehearing 
and reverse its opinion filed in this matter on September 19, 
1980. Further, the Court is requested to authorize oral argument 
with respect to the Petition for Rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted this .J.j~day of October, 1980. 
cfoad ti o( .... ~) ES B. LEE 
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